Fake VS Code Extensions Snoop on Private Repos

Infosecurity Magazine · Medium sophistication
Last updated August 5, 2026

Researchers found counterfeit Open VSX extensions impersonating real developer tools. After installation, some of these extensions quietly “beaconed” to an attacker-controlled domain and sent details about the victim’s machine plus private repository and CI/CD identifiers. The listings tried to look trustworthy by openly describing most of the data they collected, while one extension understated the most sensitive item it actually sent.

Key findings

  • Manifold reported 77 counterfeit packages on Open VSX that republished the “name and namespace of a real extension from an account that did not own it.”
  • All packages “beaconed to a single domain registered 11 days before the first package surfaced.”
  • 19 extensions collected developer and repo metadata: hostname, OS username, editor details, machine ID, git remote host/org, commit email domain, branch, HEAD commit, and CI identifiers (GitHub repo name, GitLab project path, Codespace name).
  • The extensions presented a “Telemetry” disclosure claiming no source code/credentials were taken; Manifold validated those claims for most, but found one that claimed it did not send CI values while it actually sent both names and values.
  • The code was designed to persist: it retried for seven days, resumed on editor restart, and could switch collection infrastructure via a DNS TXT record.
  • Open VSX removed the packages on Aug 3, but “the infrastructure remained live at the time of writing.”

Who’s being targeted

  • Commonly targeted roles: Developers, DevOps/Platform Engineering, CI/CD owners, Security awareness & engineering leadership.
  • Affected industries: Software development, Technology, Open-source ecosystems, Any organization using VS Code/Open VSX (including government and education).
  • Attack channels: website.
  • Impersonated: A legitimate developer-tool extension/publisher (impersonated via same name/namespace), A legitimate extension listing with a trustworthy telemetry disclosure.

Awareness takeaways

  • Require developers and build systems to install extensions only from verified publishers, and pin by publisher + version (don’t install “by name” alone).
  • Treat “unverified publisher” warnings as a stop sign, block automated installs and require review.
  • Monitor for developer tools contacting newly registered domains immediately after startup/activation; investigate as potential malicious extensions.
  • Don’t trust an extension’s telemetry/disclosure text, validate behavior, especially when it claims it is not sending sensitive values.

Red flags to watch for

  • Publisher/account does not actually own the extension name/namespace
  • Extension has "no other function" beyond a checkmark/message while it beacons data out
  • New/unknown extension contacting a recently registered domain shortly after editor startup
  • Telemetry disclosure does not match what the code actually transmits
  • Collection includes full private repo identifiers in build runners/cloud dev environments
  • Beaconing behavior immediately after activation/startup
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Read the video transcript

You install a VS Code extension that looks legit, same name, same namespace as the real one. But this one’s a counterfeit. It shows a friendly “Telemetry” section, a little checkmark in the status bar… and then quietly beacons your hostname, OS username, repo and CI identifiers to a domain registered days ago. Manifold found 77 of these on Open VSX, all copying real extensions and all phoning home to the same brand-new domain. One even claimed it only sent CI marker names while the code shipped both names and values. Your move: never install “by name” alone. Always pin extensions by verified publisher and version, if the publisher looks off or unverified, stop and get it reviewed.

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