Researchers describe a phishing workflow where an attacker logs into a victim’s Google account using stolen password + authenticator code, then quickly enrolls a new passkey to keep access even if the password is changed. The trick relies on victims choosing a weaker sign-in fallback (one-time code) instead of using an existing passkey. The article provides a step-by-step attacker workflow that can be turned into a realistic awareness simulation focused on “credential enrollment after phishing.”
Mirage safely runs attacks like this one against your own team, so you find out what happens before a real adversary does.
Imagine this: you fall for a fake Google login once… and they quietly add their own passkey to your account. With kits like iAuthFlow v2, a fake page that looks like Google relays your email, password, and authenticator-app code to a real browser. While you stare at a “verification” hold screen, it logs in as you, opens Passkey settings, and registers its own passkey in about six seconds. The twist: this only worked because the user picked the weaker fallback, typing a one-time code, instead of using an existing passkey. Even if they later change the password, that attacker-added passkey can still unlock the account until it’s removed or blocked. Your move: if a login asks for a one-time code instead of your usual passkey, stop and sign in by opening google.com yourself, and if you ever see a "new passkey added" alert you don’t recognize, go to your Google Security settings and delete it immediately.
Check Point reports that scammers are now impersonating ChatGPT/OpenAI in phishing campaigns, reflecting how mainstream the service has become. One documented example used a fake “ChatGPT Plus payment failure” notice that sent victims to a fraudulent payment page designed to capture full credit…
Check Point reports that OpenAI’s ChatGPT became a top-10 most impersonated brand in Q2 2026 phishing. One observed example used a fake “ChatGPT Plus payment failed” billing email to drive victims to a credit-card theft page. The report also notes other brand-impersonation scams using cloned stores…
Researchers described iAuthFlow v2, a phishing toolkit that steals a live Google login session and then uses that access to enroll an attacker-controlled passkey. Because passkeys are separate login methods, the attacker can often get back into the account even after the victim changes their…
Research and incident examples show attackers increasingly using trusted collaboration tools (like Microsoft Teams and Slack) to impersonate IT/support or known community members, then push victims to phishing sites, approve MFA prompts, or run malicious files. Because messages come through…
Researchers showed how an attacker could trick Microsoft Copilot into running a malicious prompt automatically just by getting a user to click a specially crafted link. The prompt can then make Copilot search connected accounts (like email and cloud storage) and send information to an external…
Researchers showed how a malicious web page could trick OpenAI’s Atlas AI-enabled browser into taking actions a user didn’t intend, like spamming WhatsApp contacts or modifying an Amazon account. The attacks used prompt-injection style instructions hidden in a seemingly legitimate “newsletter…
