A China-aligned group (TA419) impersonated well-known U.S. figures to lure AI policy experts into a fake OneDrive/Microsoft 365 login that could steal session cookies even when MFA is enabled. Separately, two U.S. airmen were sentenced for a multi-year business email compromise scheme where they phished employee credentials and sent spoofed emails to redirect business payments.
TA419, a China-aligned espionage group, built credibility by impersonating a former White House OSTP official and an economist, and in a separate instance posed as an Anthropic employee. The campaign began with benign outreach, often framed as an invitation to discuss AI policy, aimed at researchers, think tank staff, university faculty, and law firm personnel. Once a target replied, they were directed to what appeared to be a shared OneDrive document requiring a Microsoft 365 sign-in.
The critical technical element was the adversary-in-the-middle proxy sitting between the victim and the real Microsoft login page. This allowed the attackers to capture session cookies even when MFA was enabled, effectively neutralizing a control many organizations rely on as a primary defense.
The attack succeeded because it relied on layered trust rather than a single suspicious email. A credible identity, combined with a non-threatening first message and only later a request to click a link and log in, reduced suspicion at each step. By the time the victim reached the fake OneDrive page, the interaction already felt like a legitimate professional exchange, and the login flow looked authentic even though it was proxied.
In an unrelated case, two U.S. airmen ran a business email compromise scheme over nearly two years. They phished employee email credentials and used spoofed emails to redirect legitimate business payments, diverting more than $1.68 million from one victim and over $720,000 from another. This case illustrates how credential theft can be monetized directly through payment fraud rather than espionage.
Organizations handling AI policy research, legal work, or finance operations should train staff to treat document-sharing invitations with the same scrutiny as direct credential requests. Accessing OneDrive or Microsoft 365 directly, rather than through an emailed link, reduces exposure to AitM proxies. For payment-related requests, out-of-band verification through a known phone number or an established approval workflow closes the gap that spoofed emails exploit, regardless of how convincing the message appears.
Mirage safely runs attacks like this one against your own team, so you find out what happens before a real adversary does.
Targets who replied to initial benign outreach were sent to a fake OneDrive page that passed the Microsoft 365 sign-in through an adversary-in-the-middle proxy, capturing session cookies even when MFA was used.
TA419 impersonated a former White House OSTP official, an economist, and also posed as an Anthropic employee to phish AI policy experts at think tanks, universities, and law firms.
The airmen phished employee email credentials and used spoofed emails to redirect business payments, diverting more than $1.68 million from an Iowa victim and over $720,000 from an Ohio victim.
Require out-of-band verification, such as a phone call to a known number, for any request to change payment destinations, even if the email appears to come from a known employee.
Imagine this: an email from a former White House AI advisor wants your input on an AI policy paper. You reply, they send a OneDrive link. The page looks exactly like Microsoft 365, but it’s an adversary-in-the-middle proxy quietly stealing your session cookies, so they’re in even if you used MFA. Same playbook hits money too: two U.S. airmen stole over $2.4 million by phishing employee credentials, then sending calm, routine emails that quietly changed where business payments should go. Your move: if an impressive name sends a document link or anyone emails to change payment details, don’t click or approve it from the email, open Microsoft 365 or our payment system yourself and check from there.
China-aligned threat actor TA419 ran real credential-phishing campaigns targeting U.S. AI policy experts at think tanks, universities, and law firms. The operation used trust-building outreach followed by a shortened link that redirected victims through checks to a fake Microsoft/OneDrive sign-in…
A China-aligned group (TA419) targeted US AI policy experts by impersonating well-known AI and policy figures and sending friendly “collaboration” emails. If the target engaged, the attackers redirected them through multiple URLs to a fake Microsoft login pop-up designed to steal Microsoft 365…
A China-aligned espionage group (TA419) targeted U.S. AI policy experts by impersonating well-known public figures and sending credible policy-related invitations. After victims replied, the attackers sent shortened links that led to a fake OneDrive login designed to capture passwords, MFA codes,…
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Researchers say a China-aligned group (TA419) impersonated well-known AI policy figures and an Anthropic executive to lure US AI policy experts into replying to emails about a fake advisory committee or Senate report. Once a target engaged, the attackers sent shortened links that led through a fake…
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