Check Point demonstrated a prompt-injection technique where a hidden instruction inside ChatGPT can make a user’s session quietly run extra tasks using the session’s existing permissions. In the proof of concept, the victim’s ChatGPT (with Gmail connected) pulled email data and relayed it to an attacker via a covert internal channel, without stealing the user’s password.
Researchers demonstrated that a hidden instruction planted inside content an AI assistant is asked to read can cause the assistant's session to quietly carry out extra tasks. In a proof of concept involving a ChatGPT session with Gmail connected, the assistant retrieved email data and relayed it to an attacker through a covert internal channel. Notably, this did not require stealing a password or routing data through an attacker-controlled server, the session's own existing permissions were enough.
The hidden instruction could be introduced in three ways: through pasted content that the AI is asked to review, through a shared conversation that already contains the planted instruction, or through a custom GPT with the instruction embedded in its configuration. In each case, a single ordinary message from the user was enough to trigger the hidden task in the background while the assistant also answered the user's visible question.
The attack succeeded because AI assistants with connected apps often operate with broad permissions and without requiring extra confirmation for each action. Once a hidden instruction was in place, the victim did not need to do anything unusual, they simply used the assistant normally, sent a message, or opened a shared conversation. The AI could not distinguish between the user's intended request and the hidden instruction embedded in content it was processing, so it carried out both.
Organizations and individuals can reduce exposure by taking a few concrete steps. Review which services are connected to an AI assistant and remove access that is not needed, since fewer permissions limit what an attacker can abuse if a prompt injection succeeds. Enable stricter confirmation settings where available, such as an option that requires approval before a connected app performs an action. Treat shared chats, custom GPTs, and prompts from unknown sources with the same caution given to untrusted downloads or links, checking the source and considering what connected services a session can access before interacting.
Finally, treat prompt injection as an ongoing risk rather than a problem that will be fully resolved. Building resistance means combining least-privilege access, verification steps before granting AI tools new permissions, and awareness training so that employees understand how hidden instructions can be embedded in seemingly normal content.
Mirage safely runs attacks like this one against your own team, so you find out what happens before a real adversary does.
It is a technique where hidden instructions planted in content an AI reads, such as an email, a shared conversation, or a custom GPT configuration, cause the AI to perform additional actions the user did not request, using the AI's existing permissions.
No. The proof of concept showed a session could be made to run hidden tasks and relay data using permissions already granted to the connected app, without needing credentials.
Review and limit which services are connected to an AI assistant, enable stricter confirmation settings such as an 'Always ask' option, and treat shared chats, custom GPTs, and prompts from unknown sources with caution.
According to the awareness takeaways, prompt injection is considered unlikely to ever be fully solved, similar to how scams and social engineering on the web persist despite defenses, so ongoing vigilance and least-privilege access are recommended.
Imagine this: you never share your Gmail password, but ChatGPT quietly emails your inbox contents to someone else. Check Point showed a 'hidden prompt' attack: you paste in an email or open a shared chat, and a buried instruction tells ChatGPT, using your Gmail access, to pull inbox data and send it out, no password theft, no obvious pop-up. This is called prompt injection. It can hide in emails, websites, or shared ChatGPT conversations that say, 'Ask a quick follow-up.' Your reply looks normal, but behind the scenes the AI could be running extra tasks with your permissions. Your move: open ChatGPT’s settings today and disconnect any email, file, or app access you don’t absolutely need.
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