Russian Agent Posed as Food Courier at Palantir

The Record · High sophistication
Last updated November 19, 2026

U.S. prosecutors allege that Russian national Igor D’iu conducted surveillance against Palantir employees on behalf of the Russian government. The operation reportedly used employee dossiers, in-person following, covert laptop-screen photography, and a food-delivery-driver pretext to confirm employees’ home addresses. This is primarily an espionage and physical-surveillance case, but the delivery-driver impersonation provides a concrete awareness-training scenario.

Key findings

  • Igor Andreevich D’iu was charged with allegedly acting as an undeclared agent of the Russian government while targeting employees of a defense technology company understood to be Palantir.
  • Handlers allegedly supplied detailed target packages containing employee and family information, home addresses, career histories, and assessments of targets’ strengths and weaknesses.
  • D’iu allegedly posed as a food delivery driver and knocked on employees’ doors to verify who lived at the supplied addresses.
  • The alleged operation also included photographing laptop screens at nearby cafés, following employees by car, and using Wi-Fi equipment that handlers could remotely control.
  • The FBI described the case as consistent with Russian intelligence services’ growing use of criminals and other disposable agents for overseas operations.

Who’s being targeted

  • Commonly targeted roles: All employees, Executives, Employees handling sensitive defense or government-related work, Remote and hybrid workers, Corporate security teams, Facilities and workplace security personnel.
  • Affected industries: Defense technology, Software, Government and national security, Technology.
  • Attack channels: physical.
  • Impersonated: Food delivery driver.

Awareness takeaways

  • Do not confirm coworkers’ or household members’ identities, addresses, schedules, or employment details to unexpected visitors. Report suspicious doorstep inquiries to corporate security or local law enforcement.
  • Treat persistent following, suspicious vehicles near workplaces, and unusual attention during commutes as potential safety incidents. Move to a safe public location and contact emergency services or corporate security.
  • Avoid exposing work screens in public places, especially when handling sensitive material. Use privacy filters, position screens away from passers-by, and report anyone photographing or lingering near devices.
  • Report unusual requests, unexpected contact, or signs that someone has researched your home or family information. Sensitive personal details can be used to make surveillance and impersonation more convincing.

Red flags to watch for

  • An unexpected delivery arrives when nothing was ordered.
  • The visitor asks who lives at the address rather than simply delivering an order.
  • The visitor’s questions focus on a specific employee or household member.
Try Mirage

Mirage safely runs attacks like this one against your own team, so you find out what happens before a real adversary does.

Get a demo
Read the video transcript

“Food delivery for you, does Alex live here?” You didn’t order anything. Prosecutors say Igor D’iu used that food-courier pretext to check Palantir employees’ home addresses. He allegedly had dossiers on employees and their families. That’s the trick: the delivery isn’t the goal. Your answer is. An unexpected visitor asking who lives there is checking a name against an address. Don’t confirm anyone’s identity at the door. Report the unexpected inquiry to corporate security.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Similar attacks

Spy Suspect Posed as Food Delivery Worker

Spy Suspect Posed as Food Delivery Worker

US prosecutors allege that Russian national Igor D'iu was directed through Telegram to spy on employees of a Palo Alto defense technology company, widely reported to be Palantir. The alleged operation included photographing screens in coffee shops, following employees, placing remotely controlled…

November 19, 2026
Deepfakes Posed as Trusted Contacts

Deepfakes Posed as Trusted Contacts

The article describes a real campaign attributed by the US Justice Department and FBI to North Korean government hackers. The attackers used secretly recorded webcam footage and AI-generated deepfakes to impersonate trusted contacts, persuade victims to install malware, and steal cryptocurrency.…

November 18, 2026
Fake Recruiters Push ClickFix Backdoor Lures

Fake Recruiters Push ClickFix Backdoor Lures

Google reported that the MIDNIGHT NEPTUNE threat group used fake recruiter profiles to direct targets to ClickFix lures. The campaign combined a trusted job-recruitment pretext with a prompt that led victims to run attacker-provided actions, ultimately enabling deployment of the SOMBERMEME backdoor.

November 16, 2026
Stolen Faces Fuel North Korean Meeting Scams

Stolen Faces Fuel North Korean Meeting Scams

North Korean operators behind “FaceStealer” hijacked accounts and used recordings of real people in fake Zoom and Microsoft Teams meetings. They used the familiar faces of trusted contacts to convince targets to install supposed fixes for technical problems, enabling malware installation, account…

November 14, 2026
Pet Apps Hid a Deepfake Abuse Network

Pet Apps Hid a Deepfake Abuse Network

Researchers found a large network of seemingly harmless AI apps, including pet-photo tools, that secretly switched to explicit deepfake generators for some users. The operation used misleading ads and app-store listings to drive downloads, then served different content based on signals such as…

November 2, 2026
Fake Brand Deals Steal YouTube Creator Accounts

Fake Brand Deals Steal YouTube Creator Accounts

Scammers are targeting YouTube creators with personalized “sponsorship” emails that lead to a convincing fake collaboration website. The site pulls public channel data, then asks the creator to “Sign in with Google” to “verify” the channel, stealing the password and one-time code to take over Gmail…

October 8, 2026