Fake Google Update Targets AI-Editor Users

A real developer-targeted campaign used a fake “Google Update Support” extension hidden in weaponized code repositories. Victims were lured with a paid, no-coding-needed request to review a project in Cursor; opening the repository could trigger installation of an extension that collected browser, wallet, and other sensitive data.

Key findings

• The campaign used weaponized GitHub and GitLab repositories that installed a malicious VS Code extension named “Google Update Support.”
• The extension masqueraded as a Google-related developer tool but used the identifier “google-dev-tools.google-update-support”; this did not establish Google authorship or trust.
• A repository task configured with “runOn: folderOpen” could point users to the installer when they opened the project in an editor.
• The recruitment lure offered payment, a Cursor Ultra license, or a role on the team in exchange for reviewing an open-source market-analysis platform.
• The lure explicitly told recipients that “No coding needed,” reducing the chance that non-developer targets would inspect project files or tasks.
• On Windows, the extension repurposed the editor’s Electron executable to run attacker-controlled JavaScript for collection and upload activity.
• Recovered components included browser-related credential decryption logic and collection capabilities for browser and wallet data.

Who’s being targeted

• Commonly targeted roles: Software developers, Designers, Project managers, Founders, Technical recruiters, Engineering managers, AI-editor users, Cryptocurrency and digital-asset users.
• Affected industries: Software development, Technology companies, Cryptocurrency and digital-asset users, Design agencies, Startups, Professional services.
• Attack channels: email, website.
• Impersonated: A project team or startup seeking user feedback and potential collaborators, Google developer tools / Google Update Support.

Awareness takeaways

• Treat unsolicited requests to clone and open a repository in Cursor, VS Code, or another AI editor as a security review event, even when the sender says no coding is required.
• Do not trust an extension simply because its name suggests it is from Google or another well-known supplier; verify the publisher through an approved channel before installing it.
• Use an isolated, disposable environment for evaluating untrusted code projects, and keep browser profiles, wallet keys, SSH keys, and environment secrets out of that environment.
• Disable automatic workspace tasks, agent auto-run, and workspace-provided MCP configuration before opening an untrusted repository.

Red flags to watch for

• The request asks the recipient to clone and open an unsolicited repository in an AI-enabled code editor.
• The promise of payment, a Cursor Ultra license, or a place on the team is used to motivate participation.
• The claim that “No coding needed” may discourage recipients from inspecting the repository before opening it.
• The extension uses Google-branded naming but has the publisher identifier “google-dev-tools,” which does not prove it is from Google.
• The task is configured to run when a folder opens, rather than after a user intentionally starts a documented project task.
• An unfamiliar extension requests installation from within an untrusted repository or workspace.